by Alex Davidson

In the 2024 South African election the African National Congress (ANC) received 40.2% of the votes, dropping below 50% for the first time since the first democratic election in 1994. (see Table 1) (1)

 

Table 1

South African Election 2024

African National Congress

Percentage share of vote

Elections 1994-2024

YEAR	%age share of vote
1994	62.5
1999	66.4
2004	70
2009	66
2014	62
2019	57.5
2024	40.2

ANC in its analysis of the election result stated, “While the ANC has won the most votes in this election, the results show a significant decline in the ANC support from previous elections. While there are several factors that have contributed to the decline in support, the results send a clear message to the ANC. We wish to assure the people of South Africa that we have heard them. We have heard their concerns, their frustrations and their dissatisfaction.” (2)

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in a statement to the ANC National Executive wrote, “We are at a crossroads as the liberation movement, where the electorate, and in particular the working and middle classes, have handed a painful verdict on our performance…Society is correctly angered by the decade of state capture and corruption, loadshedding, deteriorating municipal and public services, a stagnant economy and rising unemployment, poverty and inequality…” (3)

VOTER TURNOUT

Voter turnout was down compared to previous elections. In 1994 voter turnout was 87% compared to 59% in the 2024 election (see Table 2). Some 11.5 million of those registered did not vote bringing the turnout down to 59%.  A further 13 million did not register to vote.

Table 2

South African Election 2024

Voter Turnout

1994-2024

YEAR	%age
1994	87
1999	89
2004	77
2009	77
2014	73
2019	66
2024	59

PARLIAMENT  

Although ANC lost its majority it remains the largest party in the South African Parliament with 159 out of 400 MPs. The second largest party is the Democratic Alliance, whose base remains largely among white voters. It saw its share of the vote increase marginally from 20.77% in 2019 to 21.81% in the 2024 election. The Democratic Alliance now has 87 MPs an increase of 3. The third largest party in Parliament is the recently formed Umkhonto Wesizwe party, led by Jacob Zuma, with 58 MPs followed by the Economic Freedom Fighters with 44 MPs down by 5. The Inkatha Freedom Party is next with 17 MPs. There are a total of 18 parties in Parliament. (see Table 3)

TABLE 3

South African election 2024

Parties, percentage share of the vote, number of seats in National Assembly

	PARTY	%age support	SEATS (400)
1	African National Congress (ANC)	40.18	159
2	Democratic Alliance (DA)	21.81	87
3	Umkhonto Wesizwe (MK)	14.58	58
4	Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9.52	39
5	Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	3.65	17
6	Patriotic Alliance (PA)	2.06	9
7	Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	1.36	6
8	Action South Africa (Action SA)	1.2	6
9	United Democratic Movement (UDM)	0.49	3
10	African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	0.6	3
11	Rise Mwanzi	0.42	2
12	National Coloured Congress (NCC)	0.23	2
13	Build One South Africa (BOSA)	0.41	2
14	African Transformation Movement (ATM)	0.4	2
15	Al-Jama	0.24	2
16	Pan African Congress (PAC)	0.23	1
17	Good	0.18	1
18	United Africans Transformation (UAT)	0.22	1

ANC LOSS OF VOTES  

ANC lost votes through many of its past supporters not voting. It also lost votes to the Umkhonto Wesizwe (MK) party, led by Jacob Zuma, particularly in KwaZulu Natal (KZN), where MK won 45% of the votes. Prior to this election ANC had lost voters to the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). This haemorrhaging of votes from ANC combined with the huge numbers of people not voting meant that ANC lost its majority for the first time since the election which ended apartheid thirty years ago.

It should be noted that ANC retained its majority control in 5 of the 9 Provinces (Limpopo, Eastern Cape, North West, Free State and Mpumalanga) and has been elected to lead the government in another 2 provinces (Northern Cape and Gauteng). Of the remaining two provinces, the Inkatha Party leads a coalition including ANC in KZN. The Western Cape is controlled by the Democratic Alliance and ANC has never held a majority in the province.

Table 4

South African Election 2024

African National Congress (ANC)

%age share of vote by Province

Province	%age share of vote
Limpopo	74.23
Eastern Cape	62.47
North West	58.53
Free State	52.88
Mpumalanga	51.89
Northern Cape	49.3
Gauteng	36.47
Western Cape	21.34
KwaZulu Natal (KZN)	17.62
Out of country	3.92

UMKHONTO WEISIZWE PARTY

Umkhonto Wesizwe (Zulu for ‘Spear of the Nation’), abbreviated as MK, was originally the ANC’s armed wing. The new Umkhonto Wesizwe party was founded in December 2023 six months prior to the election. ANC challenged the use of the name and symbol by the new party but lost in the courts. 

Jacob Zuma was prohibited from standing as a candidate in the election due to his having been convicted for Contempt of Court and sentenced to 15 months in prison. However, his name and image remained on the ballot paper as leader of the MK party. The MK party vote has a largely ethno-nationalist/tribal base with their votes being mainly in the province of KwaZulu Natal, the adjoining province of Mpumalanga and in Gauteng with high numbers of people with a Zulu heritage. (see Table 5) Beside its predominantly ethnic voter base the MK party has brought together many of those who gained positions of power and privilege, especially during the years of Zuma’s presidency and those who were involved in State Capture. 

The MK party has had a volatile start to its existence with its founder, Jabulani Khumalo being expelled, The MK party has had a volatile start to its existence with its founder Jabulani Khumalo being expelled and then, following the recent election, 20 of its MPs being dismissed and replaced. Following the election Jacob Zuma was expelled by ANC in July 2024.

Table 5

South African Election 2024

Umkhonto Wesizwe (MK) Party

%age share of vote by Province

Province	%age share of vote
KZN	45.35
Mpumalanga	16.97
Gauteng	9.79
North West	2.06
Free State	1.93
Eastern Cape	1.44
Limpopo	0.85
Northern Cape	0.79
Western Cape	0.57

.ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS

The Economic Freedom Fighters was founded in 2013 by Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu following their expulsion from ANC. The party’s support reflects grievances over the issues of unemployment, poverty and inequality. In the 2024 election it won 9.52% of the vote which was down from the previous election, losing votes to the MK party. Its vote share in KZN fell from 10% in 2019 to 2.3% in 2024. Following the election Floyd Shivambu, Deputy President and Lieutenant Commander-in Chief, left EFF and joined the MK party. He has since been appointed by Zuma as the MK party’s National Organiser.

ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM

ANC’s loss of support is due to a variety of factors. While many advances have been made since 1994 including access to clean water, electrification, sanitation, housing, education and social policy, the gap between rich and poor has grown wider, and unemployment has remained very high at around 40%. The deep-rooted causes of unemployment, poverty and inequality lie in the fact that South Africa is a capitalist state, and that apartheid remains embedded in the social-economic fabric of the country.

 

With the formal end of apartheid in 1994 and with ANC gaining political power the conditions were created for opportunism and careerism to grow within the organisation. Three years after the end of apartheid, Nelson Mandela in his Political Report to the 1997 ANC National Conference stated,

“Later in this report, we will discuss the intrusion of this self-same media within our ranks, during the last three years, to encourage our own self-destruction, with the active involvement of some who are present here as bona-fide delegates to the conference of a movement to which they owe no loyalty…In reality, during the last three years, we have found it difficult to deal with such careerists in a decisive manner. We, ourselves, have therefore allowed the space to emerge for these opportunists to pursue their counter-revolutionary goals, to the detriment of our movement and struggle. During this period, we have also been faced with various instances of corruption involving our own members, including those who occupy positions of authority by virtue of the victory of the democratic revolution…Clearly we have to take all necessary measures to purge ourselves of such members and organise ourselves in such away that will make it difficult for corrupt elements to gain entry into our movement.”

However, these problems of opportunism, careerism and corruption continued to grow alongside developing discontent with the ANC government and its policies. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) became increasingly critical of their alliance partner, ANC, and Mbeki’s government and its policies of accommodating business.

MBEKI REMOVES ZUMA

Corruption charges against Jacob Zuma over a major arms deal emerged during the trial of Schabir Sheik, charged in 2001, and who was found guilty of corruption and fraud related to the arms deal. He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison in June 2005. President Thabo Mbeki then relieved Zuma from his post as Deputy President of the Republic.

In December 2005 Zuma was charged with rape but was acquitted in May 2006 in a very high profile trial which stirred much emotion throughout the country. Corruption charges were still being pursued against Zuma but then in October 2008 a Judge found that Zuma had not been properly consulted on the charges according to the law and in his judgement referred to political interference by the Government. Following this judgement the ANC National Executive re-called Thabo Mbeki as President of the Republic. Mbeki resigned as President and Kgalema Motlanthe was elected President.

ZUMA REPLACES MBEKI  

Jacob Zuma was seen by many as a victim. He also accrued support from those discontent with the Mbeki leadership. At its Polokwane conference in 2007, Zuma was elected as ANC President defeating the incumbent, Mbeki. All of the officers elected were from the “Zuma” slate. All of these developments deepened divisions and factionalism within ANC.  

The impact of the social crises on the ANC was reported by Jonny Steinberg in his account of his several years of research in Bethlehem, eastern Free State, “I was staggered to witness the extent to which it had become a single-source economy. In the township of Bohlokong the majority of those I met who had a formal job or stable business either worked for government or were contracted to deliver a public service. I was even more staggered to discover how many of these jobs were available only to those with personal connections to leading ANC figures. The patronage networks went right down to the bottom of the municipal wage scale; I met cleaners who got their jobs through membership of their local ANC branch. The result is that branch meetings are like vipers’ nests. Factionalism is vicious and interminable because everyone needs their patron to get ahead.”

STATE CAPTURE  

Zuma’s nine years as State President saw the development of opportunism, careerism and corruption taken to new levels with what became known as State Capture. President Zuma was forced to establish a commission following a report by the Public Protector into allegations of corruption and fraud. The Judicial Commission which became known as the Zondo Commission after its chairman, Raymond Zondo, was set the task of investigating the allegations of state capture, corruption and fraud. Jacob Zuma was replaced by Cyril Ramaphosa as President of ANC and the country in 2018.

According to the Zondo Commission, State Capture evolved as a project, “…by which a relatively small group of actors, together with their network of collaborators inside and outside of the state, conspired systematically (criminally and in defiance of the constitution) to redirect resources from the state for their own gain”. The Zondo Commission’s report added that, “This was facilitated by a deliberate effort to exploit and weaken key state institutions and public entities, but also including law enforcement institutions and the intelligence services. To a large extent this occurred through strategic appointments and dismissals at public entities and a re-organisation of procurement processes.”

“The Commission found that many companies, including prominent international firms, were willing to enter into kickback arrangements to secure lucrative contracts. Auditors, bankers, lawyers, and consultants were also implicated.” (6) 

The Zondo Commission’s recommendations included proposing that law enforcement agencies should investigate individuals implicated with a view to bringing criminal charges against them. This is now in process.

DISILLUSION WITH THE ANC  

Discontent and disillusion with the ANC and its government resulted in the loss of its majority in Parliament in the 2024 election. 

Following the election COSATU issued a statement which describes the situation, “Voters are exhausted by the manner in which we conduct ourselves as cadres, where we have become synonymous with corruption, immorality and arrogance. Workers have lost faith as they have been battered by retrenchments, below inflation salary increases, a rising cost of living, the non-payment of pension and medical aid benefits, attacks on collective bargaining and painful budget cuts to frontline services. We have felt the consequences of neglecting workers. Similarly, in the course of our factional wars, we have seemingly abandoned the need to constantly nurture the spirit of non-racialism and build the movement across all communities…Despite our painful setback, we are pleased that against very difficult electoral odds, we managed to elect governments led by the ANC nationally and in seven provinces.” (7)

GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY 

Whilst ANC remains by far the largest party it no longer has a majority of seats in Parliament. (see Table 3) and so ANC proposed a Government of National Unity (GNU) and invited all parties in Parliament to join. Nine other parties joined ANC in the GNU. Umkhonto Wesizwe party and the Economic Freedom Fighters did not join and are in opposition.

The GNU is based on a Statement of Intent which the parties have signed up to. The Statement of Intent includes the following commitment, “At this historic juncture, we must act to ensure stability and peace, tackling the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality, entrench our Constitutional democracy and the rule of law, and to build a South Africa for all its people. The people of South Africa expect us to work together as political parties to achieve these objectives, and to usher in a new era of peace, justice and prosperity for all.” (8)

ANC’s National Executive Committee held a Lekgotla (conference) on 6 August 2024 and in his closing remarks, Cyril Ramaphosa, said 

“We have recognised that we need to undertake this work within a Government of National Unity comprised of parties, some of which we have sharp political and ideological differences with. We need to provide leadership to the work of the GNU not through the imposition of our will, but through the strength of our positions and the clarity of our purpose. We need to make use of the fact that the principles and minimum programme contained in the Statement of Intent that the 10 parties of the GNU committed themselves to provides a basis for far-reaching social and economic transformation.This Lekgotla has confirmed that the ANC must proceed…with greater energy with the renewal of our movement. Cde Blade Nzimande (9) reminded us that we cannot renew the ANC without renewing the Alliance. We agree. We must now make it a priority to build the Alliance as a cohesive and effective agent of change within a common programme of action. Having taken the view that the GNU is the best tactical option, the ANC is fully aware about the risks and potential threats of this moment. We have noted the statement of the South African Communist Party on the occasion of its 103rd anniversary that the Party ‘takes a critical but non-oppositionist stance’ towards the GNU. We welcome this. We agree with the statement by the SACP that: ‘We must ensure that our participation [in the GNU] does not undermine our core principles and goals but serves as a platform to defend and advance working-class interests.’” (10)

GNU

ANC aims to continue to pursue a policy of non-alignment in foreign policy with the GNU. It remains committed to the work of BRICS+ and solidarity with Palestine, Venezuela and Cuba. Ronald Lamola, who as Justice Minister in the previous government, led the case at the International Court of Justice against Israel for its genocidal policy, has been appointed Foreign Minister in the GNU. 

In terms of its domestic policy, time will tell if the ANC is able to renew itself, lead the GNU in a progressive direction and improve the lot of the masses of the people. It will be a difficult and uphill task.

(1)  https://results.elections.org.za/home/ All tables in this article are drawn from South African Independent Election Commission’s website.

(2) https://www.anc1912.org.za/statement-by-anc-secretary-general-on-outcome-of-2024-elections/

(3) COSATU statement to ANC NEC Lekgotla, 6 August 2024.

(4) Nelson Mandela, Political Report to 50^th ANC Conference, 1997.

(5) Steinberg, Jonny, “South Africa could grant itself the way to something big”, Business Day, 6 May 2021.

(6)  https://www.statecapture.org.za/ The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption, and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State.

(7) COSATU Message of Support: ANC NEC Lekgotla, 5 August 2024

(8) https://www.anc1912.org.za/statement-of-intent-of-the-2024-government-of-national-unity-2/

(9) Blade Nzimande MP is chair of the SACP and a cabinet minister in the GNU.

(10) https://www.anc1912.org.za/closing-remarks-by-anc-president-cyril-ramaphosa-to-the-anc-nec-lekgotla/, 6 August 2024

 

COSATU protest against state capture 2017. photo by Discot