Review by Milly Cunningham

Joseph E. Davies was United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1936 to 1938. He describes Mission to Moscow as, “A record of confidential dispatches to the State Department, official and personal correspondence, current diary and journal entries, including notes and comment up to October 1941.”

Davies explains, “I had not intended writing a book but times have changed. Russia is in the thick of this fight…’ He continues, ‘In our country there has been…misinformation about Russia and the Soviet Union…I am definitely not a Communist,” he says. “I am called a capitalist, but I think that the better word is ‘individualist’…[however] When I went to Russia, I made up my mind that I was going to go there free from prejudice and with an open mind.” He concludes, “I came to have a deep respect and affection for the Russian people.”

SEEING FOR HIMSELF 

During his stay, Davies made a point of travelling to many parts of the Soviet Union to see for himself. Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, with whom Davies had many conversations, expressed the view that he had acquired more information and knowledge of Russia in the first three months he was in the country than any other Ambassador had obtained in two years. Davies reported in March 1937 to President Roosevelt on ten days of travel through the country’s industrial districts. “What these people have done in the past seven years in heavy industry is unique…Bare plains have been transformed into huge industrial areas within six years. The plants and equipment which I saw are first-class…All these plants have laboratories, technical libraries, nightly lectures. Their factory cost accounting is translated into graphic charts, showing both operations and trends up to the minute. Each plant has its kindergartens (creches for nursing mothers), workers’ clubs, restaurants, and other social provisions for the workers…The planning impresses the mind as being most extraordinary in the boldness of its conception and the vigour of its execution.” He adds, “Granted five or ten years of peace, extraordinary results will be developed by this industrial programme.”  

During his time in the Soviet Union, Davies visited art exhibitions and attended the opera, theatre and ballet, and everywhere he was impressed at the quality of what he saw. These experiences spoiled him, for he says on his way back home on leave he stopped off in Paris, “We went to the opera, Marouf, the Cobbler of Cairo. We did not stay long. Outside of the singing and one male dancer it was quite below par and couldn’t compare with the Russian opera of either Moscow or Leningrad.”

Davies enthusiastically describes the three days of national holiday to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet revolution, and the festive atmosphere all over Moscow, the huge flags, the red bunting, the slogans, large murals by prominent artists attached to the sides of buildings. In the parade in Red Square, with up to 1,200,000 participants, as well as “a first-class exhibition of military strength”. He adds, “The most impressive feature of the Red Square celebration to me personally was the demonstration of marching workers…a perfect sea of standards, transparencies, banners with slogans, and small allegorical models which were being carried by thousands of apparently enthusiastic marchers.”

Three of what are usually termed in the west ‘show trials’ took place while Davies was ambassador. He attended all sessions of two of them. Davies reports of the first trial, “With an interpreter at my side, I followed the testimony carefully. Naturally I must confess that I was predisposed against the credibility of the testimony of the defendants.” However, “I arrived at the reluctant conclusion that the state had established its case, at least to the extent of proving the existence of a widespread conspiracy and plot among the political leaders against the Soviet government.” Davies also reports that all but possibly one of the diplomatic corps in Moscow agreed. However, he also notes that another diplomat made a revealing comment. He “said that the defendants were undoubtedly guilty; that all of us who attended the trial had practically agreed on that; that the outside world, from the press reports, however, seemed to think that the trial was a put-up job (façade, as he called it); that while we knew it was not, it was probably just as well that the outside world should think so.” The reactions of Davies and those of his fellow diplomats who attended the second trial were the same. 

LEAD UP TO WAR

Davies’s observations on the period up to and after the conclusion of what is usually referred to as the Hitler-Stalin pact are particularly interesting. His conversations with Litvinov revealed the deep concern the Soviet leadership had about the danger of war. Writing to the US Secretary of State on March 26^th 1937, he quoted Litvinov as believing “the only hope for the preservation of European peace as a prompt, firm declaration of the democracies of Europe that they were standing together for peace; he named France, Russia and Czechoslovakia,” and hoped the United States would join as well. The Soviet leadership emphasised the importance of collective security in facing the aggressor nations, and an end to constant retreat. Davies reported many times his fears over the signs that England and France were trying to leave Russia out of any peace agreements. In September 1937 he reported to the US Secretary of State and mentioned England’s “recent advances to Germany, which appear to be at the expense of the Soviet Union.”   

Davies had no doubt about the threat of German attack on the Soviet Union. He writes, “This menace very obviously is constantly in the forefront of the minds of this government. Hitler’s plan, as outlined in Mein Kampf and subsequently elaborated upon in his Nuremberg speech, in which the grain fields of the Ukraine were specifically mentioned, the Drang nach Osten, all point to this possibility.” On January 18^th 1939, Davies writes to a friend, “Conditions are hell over here. Chamberlain’s peace is a flop…there is neither collective security nor a balance of power to secure peace and the civilization of Europe…Specifically there is one thing that can be done now in my opinion and that is to give some encouragement to Russia to remain staunch for collective security and peace. The reactionaries of England and France have quarantined her…The Chamberlain policy of throwing Italy, Poland, and Hungary into the arms of Hitler may be completed by so disgusting the Soviets that it will drive Russia into an economic agreement and an ideological truce with Hitler. The reactionaries of England and France will shortly be wooing the Soviets’ support in their desperation, but it may be too late if the Soviets get utterly disheartened.”

In his diary on April 3^rd 1939, Davies, on a visit to London, writes that he had advised Joseph Kennedy, US Ambassador to the UK, to “tell Chamberlain from me that if they aren’t careful they would drive Stalin into Hitler’s arms. Britain and France had snubbed Russia, their then ally, by excluding the Soviets from Munich…that Stalin wanted peace for Russia above all else; that he might decide to take Hitler as the best bet for this security, at least for the time being…Somehow or other it seems impossible to make an impression in this London atmosphere.” In his journal of May 31^st 1939, Davies quotes Molotov’s speech on Soviet foreign relations, “He said: ‘We stand for peace and against aggression, but we must remember Stalin’s admonition that we cannot be used to pull the chestnuts of others out of the fire’…The British and French did not meet, he said, the requirements of full reciprocity and equality of obligations in their proposals.”

On 22^nd August, 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression agreement was announced in the press. On that day Davies writes to the Acting US Secretary of State, “The development of this non-aggression pact between Russia and Germany to me was not unexpected…During the Litvinov tenure in the Foreign Office…the Soviet regime, in my opinion, diligently and vigorously tried to maintain a vigorous common front against the aggressors and were sincere advocates of the ‘indivisibility of peace’”. But since Munich, and even before, distrust had grown with the Chamberlain and Daladier governments. “During the Soviet-British-French negotiations, including the sessions of the Strang mission and Military Missions to Moscow, this distrust was intensified by the fact that these authorities were not clothed with power to close a final, definite realistic alliance. The suspicion continued to grow that Britain and France were playing a diplomatic game to place the Soviets in a position where Russia would have to fight Germany alone.” And so the Soviet leaders, “characteristically boldly reversed their attitude and decided to secure their own position by making a pact of non-aggression with Germany, which would assure peace for Russia, at least for a time, regardless of any possibility of war in Europe.” On September 25^th 1939, Davies writes, “The Moscow-Berlin pact was probably one of the greatest diplomatic defeats the British Empire ever sustained.”

SOVIET OBJECTIVES 

Davies continued to analyse the situation in Europe, writing on October 12^th 1939, “I am disposed to the opinion that the Russian policy may be exactly what she proclaims it to be; namely, a desire to establish peace in Europe if she can, and particularly on her eastern border, and in addition thereto to develop her own resources secure from attack of the capitalistic western nations. To effect this security, naturally, the Soviets would desire to have their western line shoved as far west from Moscow and the Don Basin as possible, as a protection against a possible enemy Germany.” Responding to accusations that Russia had designs on other countries, Davies said, “Stalin’s whole plan since 1926 has been to develop an internal economy that would be self-sufficient and create a socialistic communistic community that would be a model for the world; and he said to me himself that they figured for him and his associates to achieve that was a man-sized job and as much as they could do, without trying to run the whole world.”

Writing in November 1939, Davies adds, in relation to England and France, “Molotov declared the policy of the USSR to be one of neutrality. Thus Hitler…paid a very high price…there are indicators that the Russians will not really cooperate; that the Soviets are pursuing an independent policy based solely on self-interest and that Hitler is not too happy about it.” In his journal on March 30^th 1940, Davies writes, “In the speech of Premier Molotov, Foreign Minister, before the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union on March 29, this significant statement appeared: ‘We must maintain our position of neutrality and must refrain from participation in the war between the great powers. This policy not only serves the interests of the Soviet Union, but also exercises a restraining influence on attempts to kindle and spread the war in Europe.’” As Davies reported, the Soviet Union continued with its policy of neutrality after the defeat of France and the entry of Italy into the war.

On March 3^rd 1941, when the Bulgarian government consented to the entry of German troops into Bulgaria, Davies notes in his diary, “The Soviet Foreign Office formally notified the Bulgarian Minister that…this action led not to peace but to an extension of the sphere of war, and that the Soviet government conforming to its peace policy would not support the Bulgarian government in the execution of their present policy. This is going pretty far in opposition to Hitler’s plans.” The Soviet Union also in March confirmed to Turkey that if she had to defend her territory, she could rely on Russia complying entirely with the non-aggression pact between the two countries, and could count on the neutrality of the USSR.

Once Germany attacked the Soviet Union, on June 22^nd 1941, Davies’s position did not waver. He reports in his journal the following day that after an alumni dinner in Washington, he spoke to the correspondent for the United Press, “I said that it was all to the good for the Western democracies…that, in my opinion, the extent of the resistance of the Red Army would amaze and surprise the world; and even though Hitler were to take a substantial part of the Ukraine, his troubles would then just begin, in my opinion. It was just plain common sense for us to give the Soviets all the aid we possibly could, because they were fighting the greatest danger to our security in the world, the menace of Hitler’s aggression and lust for world domination. It was based upon what I myself had seen in Russia. 

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION BETRAYED 

Finally, Davies had his own response to those who equated the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany.  He writes in his journal on July 7^th 1941, “To my amazement, I find that my friend, Lindbergh, is quoted that he would prefer Nazism to Communism…It would be a desperate choice to make, but there is a very widespread difference between the two…the Christian religion could be imposed upon the communistic principles without doing any violence to its economic and political purposes, the primary one of which is based upon “the brotherhood of men”…Nazi philosophy creates a government which is in fact based upon the denial of the altruistic principles of the Christian religion…To it, war is a virtue. Brotherly love, charity, justice, and Christian virtues are indications of weakness and decadence if they conflict with the utilitarian needs of the state…The communistic ideal is that the state may evaporate and be no longer necessary as man advances into perfect brotherhood. The Nazi ideal is the exact opposite – that the state is the supreme end of all.”

In Davies’s Last Word he says, “In my opinion, the Russian people, the Soviet government, and the Soviet leaders are moved, basically, by altruistic concepts. It is their purpose to promote the brotherhood of man and to improve the lot of the common people. They wish to create a society in which men may live as equals, governed by ethical ideals. They are devoted to peace. They have made great sacrifices attempting to achieve those spiritual aspirations.” He had hopes of a future of international cooperation against “denizens of a jungle whose only rule is that of tooth and claw” – hopes sadly to be dashed, chiefly by the leaders of his own country.

 

Red Square Moscow photo by Vyacheslav Argenberg

Conditions are hell over here. Chamberlain’s peace is a flop…there is neither collective security nor a balance of power to secure peace and the civilization of Europe…